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I. Introduction
One prior art patent describes an adjustable gas pedal for a car. Another prior
art patent describes a pedal-mounted sensor to link the car pedal to a computer-
controlled throttle. Would it have been obvious to a pedal engineer of ordinary
skill, in February 1998, to combine the two prior art items into a sensor-bearing
adjustable gas pedal? If so, the sensor-bearing pedal was not properly patentable,
even if it was new at that time.
On roughly these facts, the Supreme Court granted review in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.2 to decide "[w]hether the Federal Circuit ha[d]
erred in holding that a claimed invention cannot be held 'obvious,' and thus
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in the absence of some proven 'teaching,
suggestion, or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art
to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.",3 Reversing the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and reinstating the District Court's
summary judgment of invalidity of the asserted patent claim, the Supreme Court
concluded that "the Court of Appeals analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner
Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. Many thanks to Tim Holbrook, Andy Johnson-
Laird, Mike Madison, Greg Mandel, Bob Matthews, Matt Phillips, and Josh Sarnoff for comments
on drafts.
THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1432 (2d ed. 2005).
2 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-
1530), 2005 WL 835463 (internal quotations omitted).
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inconsistent with §103 and [the Supreme Court's] precedents." 4 The factors the
Supreme Court first set out 41 years ago, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,5 "continue
to define the inquiry that controls" '6 a nonobviousness determination.
The Court's unanimous opinion did not, however, utterly reject the Federal
Circuit's suggestion test. Praising attentiveness to evidence of a suggestion to
combine prior art teachings as "a helpful insight," the Court agreed with the Federal
Circuit that "a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely
by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior
art."7 Indeed, "it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the
claimed new invention does. 8 As a result, "[t]here is no necessary inconsistency
between the idea underlying the [suggestion] test and the Graham analysis." 9 The
wholesome support that evidence of a pre-existing suggestion provides to the denial
of patent protection becomes error only when it hardens into a sine qua non:
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and when it
is so applied, the [suggestion] test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching,
suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles
and the explicit content of issued patents. . . . [W]hen a court transforms the general
principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did
here, it errs.
An "expansive and flexible approach" works best," instead, and "[i]n determining
whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular
motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls."'
12
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1746. See also id. at 1739 ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the
Court of Appeals."); id. at 1743 ("What we hold is that the fundamental misunderstandings
identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent with our patent
law decisions.").
5 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
6 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
7 Id. at 1741.
8 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007); see also id. at 1740-41 ("Often, it
will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of
demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether
there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent
at issue.").
9 Id. at 1741.
Id.
11 Id. at 1739.
12 Id. at 1741-42; see also id. at 1742 ("The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem
motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent's subject matter. ...
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In what sense, if at all, does the Federal Circuit's suggestion test survive? Is
it possible to say more than that the inquiry is now more "expansive and flexible"?
To answer these questions, we must grasp that the Supreme Court differs with the
Federal Circuit not merely over verbal formulae, but rather over a foundational
premise for the patent system: Mistakes are inevitable in any patent regime that,
like our own, strives to sort the nonobvious wheat from the obvious chaff. It is now
plain that, for the Supreme Court, a wrongful patent grant is more harmful than a
wrongful denial. For the Federal Circuit, by contrast, a wrongful patent denial is
more harmful than a wrongful grant. As a result of this fundamental inversion,
although the Supreme Court's KSR decision uses familiar expressions about the
nonobviousness requirement, KSR remixes them in a transformative way. One of
KSR's teachings-"A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton"' 3 -is refreshingly new to the nonobviousness canon.
And it is around this "ordinary creativity" core that the Supreme Court reworks its
longstanding cautions against extending patent protection too readily to
recombinations of prior art technologies. The result is effectively a rebuttable
presumption of obviousness for patent claims that remix prior art elements to yield
predictable results.' 4 KSR is, in short, a remix about remixing.
This essay has three parts. First, I show that the Federal Circuit has
predicated its suggestion test on the premise that hindsight-driven distortion poses
the gravest risk to a proper nonobviousness inquiry. That court has shaped the
suggestion test to prevent the wrongful denials of patent protection that hindsight
bias would otherwise provoke. Specifically, in the Federal Circuit, the suggestion
test's operational core has been a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the
art ("phosita") who is drained of all creativity, spontaneity, and inventiveness-in
short, a dullard who cannot innovate without a pointer showing the way. On this
view, inventors merit our protection because they are (literally) in a class by
themselves. Next, I show how KSR rejects hindsight dread and the dullard phosita
by foregrounding the Court's longstanding skepticism toward patent claims that
recite a new combination of prior art elements, also known as "combination
claims." In doing so, the Court upends a quarter century of Federal Circuit denial
that combination claims, as a group, merit a more skeptical stance. The new
operational core is not a dullard phosita, but rather a person of ordinary skill and
creativity in the art-a "phosacita." Finally, ending with a remix of my own, I
Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the
manner claimed.").
Id. at 1742.
14 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) ("The combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results.").
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propose a framework for determining whether a combination claim is nonobvious,
adapting a rebuttable presumption mechanism that, until now, the Federal Circuit
has reserved for claims that recite a variable that falls within a range already shown
in the prior art.
II. The Hindsight Lament
The Federal Circuit had long held that, to prove that an invention would have
been obvious to the ordinary artisan, it was not enough to show that the pertinent
prior art at the time taught the ordinary artisan all (or most of) the separate parts of
an invention, and their respective functions, in a grouping of pertinent prior art
references. 15 One had to prove, in addition, that "the prior art as a whole would
have suggested [the invention] to one skilled in the art."' 16
The Federal Circuit's demand for proof of a suggestion or motivation to
combine or modify the pertinent prior art was aimed specifically at preventing the
hindsight bias from tainting the nonobviousness inquiry. Psychologist Baruch
Fischhoff, commenting on the then-current literature, described the hindsight bias
as follows:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in
foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable" before it happened. People
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was
actually the case. They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in
hindsight what they knew in foresight. 
17
The Federal Circuit's unflagging effort to prevent hindsight bias is not merely
a reflection of recent cognitive social psychology findings. To the contrary,
"concern about the corruption of judgments of nonobviousness by improper
'hindsight' is a strong theme in Federal Circuit opinions.' 18
15 Where the prior art contains a single reference that shows each and every limitation of the claimed
invention (expressly or inherently), the invention is old, i.e., it fails the novelty criterion. See
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 77 (2d ed. 2004) ("An
invention is judged novel unless a single prior art reference discloses every element of the
challenged claim and enables one skilled in the art to make the invention." (emphasis added)). In
such a case, there is no need to further inquire whether the invention would have been obvious.
16 Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming the trial
court's conclusion that the claimed invention was not invalid for obviousness). Citations for the
point are legion. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[l][e][ii] nn.56, 57 (2005)
(collecting cases).
17 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).
18 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887 (2004). Professors Merges and Duffy, in their
comprehensive and engaging study of the Graham case, opine that "[t]he Federal Circuit has been
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This concern about hindsight bias has a fine pedigree. For well over a
century, U.S. courts-including the Supreme Court-have been alert to the
distortion that hindsight threatens when, long after the fact, one evaluates whether
an invention would have been obvious to the ordinary artisan at the time the actual
invention took place. 19 It is only a slight exaggeration to say that we have had
judicial hand wringing about the hindsight bias for about as long as we have had a
nonobviousness requirement for patent protection.
The contemporary Federal Circuit has justified its suggestion test as the key
guardian against hindsight-based wrongful rejections of patent rights: "To prevent
hindsight invalidation of patent claims, the law requires some 'teaching, suggestion
or reason' to combine cited references.,, 20 For example, in a recent case
obsessed with avoiding hindsight to deny patents to meritorious inventions." John F. Duffy &
Robert P. Merges, The Story of Graham v. John Deere Company: Patent Law's Evolving Standard
of Creativity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 109, 155 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (approving "secondary
considerations" evidence on the ground that it "may also serve to guard against slipping into use
of hindsight and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in
issue" (citation omitted)); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279
(1944) ("Viewed after the event, the means.., adopted seem simple and such as should have been
obvious to those who worked in the field, but this is not enough to negative invention."); Loom
Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881) ("Now that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to
any one that he could have done it as well. This is often the case with inventions of the greatest
merit."); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Aghnides, 246 F.2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1957) ("Obviousness does
not mean that one skilled in the art can perceive the solution after it has been found and pointed
out by someone else; the test of obviousness is as of an earlier time, when the search is on.");
Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg., 206 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1953) ("[I]n determining whether invention
exists in a given device, courts should guard against oversimplification through a hindsight view
of the problem as originally encountered."); Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Whisnant, 126 F.2d 19, 22
(4th Cir. 1942) ("After a new invention is completed, it is then very easy to see how it was
accomplished. But such enlightenment, resembling apparent simplicity, is the product of
hindsight."); Lakeshire Cheese Co. v. Shefford Cheese Co., 72 F.2d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1934)
("Whether a patent involves invention is to be determined in the light of historical facts rather than
what might appear to be simple in the light of hindsight."); Skinner Bros. Belting Co. v. Oil Well
Improvements Co., 54 F.2d 896, 898 (10th Cir. 1931) ("We know that we should try to eliminate
'hindsight'; we know that the fact that the problem existed, that financial reward awaited a
solution, and that no one did think of it, is strong evidence of invention."); Faries Mfg. v. George
W. Brown & Co., 121 F. 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1902) ("[Tlhe same wonder accompanies every step
forward in the useful arts. The eye that sees a thing already embodied in mechanical form gives
little credit to the eye that first saw it in imagination. But the difference is just the difference
between what is common observation and what constitutes an act of creation. The one is the eye
of inventive genius; the other of a looker on after the fact."); Johnson v. Forty-Second St., M. &
St. N. Ave. R. Co., 33 F. 499, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) ("In judging of the invention care should
be taken not to underestimate its value, because the apparatus, now that we have seen it work,
seems so plain and simple .... There is always the danger, unless care is taken to divest the mind
of the idea added to the art by the inventor, that the invention will be viewed and condemned in
the light of ascertained facts. With his description for a guide, it is an easy task to trace the steps
from the aggregation to the invention.").
20 McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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overturning a Patent Office determination that a decorative jack-o-lantern plastic
lawn bag for leaves would have been obvious, the Federal Circuit succinctly
explained that
the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based
obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the
teaching or motivation to combine prior art references. Combining prior art references
without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the
inventor's disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat
patentability-the essence of hindsight.
21
In the Dembiczak case, the court reversed the Patent Office's conclusion that the
lawn bag invention at issue would have been obvious due to the lack of sufficient
evidence in the record of a suggestion or motivation to combine the jack-o-lantern
paper bag prior art with the orange plastic trash bag prior art that the Patent Office
had before it.
22
The Federal Circuit's hindsight-prevention rationale for the suggestion test
did not originate in that court. Instead, it originated in one of its two predecessor
courts, the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals (CCPA).23  No later than 1975,
Judge Giles Rich, then on the CCPA, made the link quite clear: "There must ... be
a reason apparent at the time the invention was made to the person of ordinary skill
in the art for applying the teaching at hand, or the use of the teaching as evidence of
obviousness will entail prohibited hindsight., 24 Not long after the Federal Circuit's
creation in 1982, Chief Judge Howard Markey reaffirmed the CCPA's hindsight-
In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). It must be said,
however, that combination without suggestion shows hindsight only to the extent that an ordinary
artisan is incapable of creatively, spontaneously remixing known prior art elements when
confronted with a new problem.
22 Id. at 999-1001. Professors Schechter and Thomas conclude their discussion of the lawn bag case
by observing:
In cases such as Dembiczak the court's reasoning seems excessively mechanical.... In most
fields, practitioners are seldom such dullards as to require detailed step-by-step instructions to
accomplish basic tasks. Yet here, and in other cases, the Federal Circuit seems to state that an
invention would not have been obvious unless its precise recipe existed in the prior art....
Worse, the current Federal Circuit approach risks diluting the nonobviousness requirement to
little more than an anticipation test conducted over multiple references.
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 15, at 161 (citation omitted).
23 See, e.g., In re Scott, 323 F.2d 1016, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (Rich, J.) ("The rejection, in our
opinion, is based upon an improper hindsight view of the art after having full benefit of
appellant's disclosure. The concept of [the claimed invention] is not fairly suggested in the art.");
In re Shaffer, 229 F.2d 476, 479 (C.C.P.A. 1956) ("[I]t is not enough for a valid rejection to view
the prior art in retrospect once an applicant's disclosure is known. The art applied should be
viewed by itself to see if it fairly disclosed doing what an applicant has done.").
24 In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 573 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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prevention rationale for demanding proof of a suggestion as part of one's
obviousness case:
To imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the invention in suit, when
no prior art reference or references of record convey or suggest that knowledge, is to fall
victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the
inventor taught is used against its teacher.
Recent cases simply echo this now-familiar equation: "the suggestion to combine
requirement stands as a critical safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote
application of the legal test for obviousness. 26
The Federal Circuit's vigilance against a creeping hindsight bias led it, in
turn, to dumb down the hypothetical phosita. Indeed, the court has indulged "a
judicial presumption, with little if any support in the statutory language, that [the]
PHOSITA is an uncreative plodder, incapable of making inventions of his own. 27
Judge Rich, once again, clearly set out the theory:
The statutory emphasis [in the Patent Act] is on a person of ordinary skill. Inventors, as
a class, according to the concepts underlying the Constitution and the statutes that have
created the patent system, possess something-call it what you will-which sets them
apart from the workers of ordinary skill, and one should not go about determining
obviousness under § 103 by inquiring into what patentees (i.e., inventors) would have
known or would likely have done, faced with the revelations of [the prior art]
references. A person of ordinary skill in the art is also presumed to be one who thinks
along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to
innovate, whether by patient, and often expensive, systematic research or by
extraordinary insights, it makes no difference which.
28
Perhaps a dullard phosita is the inevitable by-product of a vigorous
suggestion test. The accomplishments of a creative, rather than a dullard, artisan of
ordinary skill would doubtless be harder to distinguish from a hindsight-driven
retrospective assessment of a patent applicant's contribution to the field; as the
suggestion test drives out hindsight, it drives down the phosita's competence. In
any event, a focus on express suggestions in the prior art-the more common
kind29-deflates the ordinary artisan's problem-solving skills. As Professor
25 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Equating
combination-absent-suggestion with hindsight ignores the role an ordinary artisan's ordinary
creativity plays in solving problems.
26 In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
27 Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 891; see also Joseph P. Meara, Just Who is the Person Having
Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REv. 267, 276
(2002) ("Phosita is not the inventor, but rather an uncreative person that thinks along conventional
lines, never seeking to innovate.").
28 Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29 See Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355-56 ("Although the suggestion to combine references may flow from
the nature of the problem, the suggestion more often comes from the teachings of the pertinent
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Eisenberg put it, "[a]ctive practitioners of a technology bring more to a problem
than may be found in written prior art, including training, judgment, intuition, and
tacit knowledge acquired through field experience.
30
If the court's cases are any indication, fear of hindsight-driven distortion has
played a large role in the Federal Circuit's drift to an improperly rigid suggestion
test. In the service of that test, the court drained the phosita of the creative
problem-solving, inventive skills that are the natural heritage of developmentally
healthy human beings. Linked together, the dullard phosita and rigid suggestion
test made for an easily-cleared nonobviousness hurdle: "[A]ny independent
thought overcomes the obviousness bar. If a mediocre artisan has to do more than
read the prior art and myopically follow its suggestions, the invention is not
obvious.",31 Thus matters stood at the Federal Circuit before KSR.
III. The Ordinary Creativity Impromptu
KSR demotes the hindsight bias from bMte noire to manageable pest. At the
same time, it foregrounds the phosita's creativity. This is the new environment in
which the remaining trace of the suggestion principle must live, an environment
that gives the suggestion inquiry an entirely different tone.
The Supreme Court does not deny that hindsight bias is a risk in deciding
whether a claimed invention would have been obvious. In Graham, its seminal
decision on how to implement § 103, the Court acknowledged the helpful role that
objective evidence (e.g., long-felt unmet need, the failure of other artisans to solve
the problem) can play in ameliorating the effects of hindsight.32 In KSR, the Court
reaffirms Graham33 and, at the same time, describes as a "fundamental
misunderstanding" the Federal Circuit's relentless focus on the hindsight bias: "A
factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and
references or from the ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art that certain references are of
special importance in a particular field." (citations omitted)).
30 Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 897.
31 Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer Doctrine to 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 389 n.22 (2001); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/05/2003/1 0/innovationrpt.pdf ("Some applications of the
suggestion test ... appear almost to have read the PHOSITA out of the statute. Inventive
processes typically involve judgment, experience, and common sense capable of connecting some
dots. The suggestion test, rigidly applied, assumes away a PHOSITA's typical levels of creativity
and insight and supports findings of nonobviousness even when only a modicum of additional
insight is needed." (citation omitted)).
32 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (approving "secondary considerations"
evidence on the ground that it "may also serve to guard against slipping into use of hindsight and
to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue" (citation
omitted)).
33 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
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must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. Rigid preventative
rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither
necessary under our case law nor consistent with it." 34 Hindsight dread, the soul of
the Federal Circuit's suggestion test, should no longer drive the nonobviousness
inquiry.
What, if anything, replaces the Federal Circuit's concern about hindsight
bias? The Supreme Court twice voices concern in KSR about the harm to
innovation that wrongful patent grants produce. First, in concluding that "[t]he
diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against" a
"formalistic" suggestion test, the Court explains that "[g]ranting patent protection
to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards
progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements,
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility." 35 Second, in summarizing its
holding, the Court concludes that, because "progress beginning from higher levels
of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation
are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts. '36 In a sense,
the Court guides us away from a familiar and tempting hero bias, i.e., the tendency
to confer an unwarranted "heroic inventor" status on one who simply makes an
obvious invention using ordinary creativity. 37 And, as the foregoing shows, the
Court views it as more important to avoid the wrongful grant of an obvious patent
than to avoid the wrongful denial of a nonobvious one.
Perhaps nothing better demonstrates the Supreme Court's rejection of the
Federal Circuit's pre-KSR suggestion test than the Court's renewed conclusion that
a claim that recites a new combination of elements already known in the art, i.e., a
34 Id. at 1742-43 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1741.
36 Id. at 1746; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)
("Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional
determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and
exploitation of either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material.").
37 Commentators have long recognized that the "heroic inventor" icon plays a central role in our
accounts of innovation. See, e.g., Ralph C. Epstein, Industrial Invention: Heroic, or Systematic?,
40 Q.J. ECON. 232, 237-38 (1926) ("When one man is given complete or practically complete
credit for a particular invention, when that invention is conceived to have flashed virtually from
his brain alone, or to have been worked out by him as a result of his peculiar inspiration or genius,
we have what may be termed an 'heroic theory' of invention. Such accounts of the course of
invention are commonly found in biographies.... What the advocates of the heroic theory always
assert or imply is that without the one man whose life they are chronicling, a particular invention
could not, or would not, readily have been forthcoming."); Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910-22 (2002) (discussing at length "the 'heroic inventor' in U.S.
patent law iconography").
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combination claim, is presumptively obvious. More than 55 years ago, in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., the Court posed the
general question, "What indicia of invention should the courts seek in a case where
nothing tangible is new, and invention, if it exists at all, is only in bringing old
elements together? '3 8  In answering, the Court summarized what was already a
settled principle:
Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the
difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. The
function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be
sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely
available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements
with no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously
withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the
resources available to skillful men.
39
With respect to the grocery store check-out counter patent in suit, the Great
Atlantic Court concluded that "[t]his case is wanting in any unusual or surprising
consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned, and there is
nothing to indicate that the lower courts scrutinized the claims in light of this rather
severe test."
4 0
In KSR, the Court squarely reaffirms its skepticism of combination claims,
putting that skeptical stance on an equal doctrinal footing with both § 103 of the
Patent Act, enacted two years after Great Atlantic,41 and the seminal Graham case:
38 Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150 (1950).
39 Id. at 152-53 (emphases added). For a comprehensive review of earlier Supreme Court cases that
hewed to the same principle, see Mary Helen Sears, Combination Patents and 35 U.S.C. § 103,
1977 DETROIT C.L. REv. 83, 91-94.
40 GreatAtl., 340 U.S. at 152.
41 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.).
Judge Rich later recounted that the Court's decision in Great Atlantic galvanized the patent bar to
press for a new Patent Act section on nonobviousness that would supersede, among other things,
Great Atlantic itself:
In December 1950 the bar was far from unanimous in thinking that the statute should deal with
the requirement for "invention," not even the members of the Committee agreed. There are
always those who prefer the status quo, with which they have learned to live, no matter how
ridiculous it may be. Now, it is very significant that what persuaded the Coordinating Committee
to replace the case law with a statutory provision was the Supreme Court's opinion, and Mr.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, published in the New York Times on the very day in 1950
the Committee was having a meeting, in the case of The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 87 USPQ 303, (The "A&P" Case on the checkout
counter). I am sure that it is because I remember reading the opinions aloud that day to the
Drafting Committee. The decision may have been all right, but we considered what was said in
the opinions to be typical of all that was wrong with the patent law's "invention" requirement.
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Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court's earlier
instructions concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the
combination of elements found in the prior art.... The combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results.
42
The Supreme Court's enduring caution toward the patentability of combination
claims is especially striking because the Federal Circuit, and the CCPA before it,
repeatedly rejected this approach as errant nonsense, often denying the very notion
of a combination claim as an identifiable type of claim.43  By 1991, the Federal
•.. [W]e determined to replace [the majority opinion in A&P] with a statute that hopefully made
more sense. And my position is that Congress, enacting the Patent Act of 1952, did replace the A
& P Case reasoning-not its decision on the facts-by substituting statutory for case law.
Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 AIPLA Q.J. 26, 32 (1972).
KSR, embracing Great Atlantic alongside § 103, decisively rejects this position.
42 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (citing Great Atl., 340 U.S. at 152);
see also id. at 1740 ("when a patent 'simply arranges old elements with each performing the same
function it had been known to perform' and yields no more than one would expect from such an
arrangement, the combination is obvious" (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282
(1976))); id. at 1740 ("a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use
of prior art elements according to their established functions"); id. at 1741 (noting that "common
sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the
combination of two known devices according to their established functions").
The Supreme Court's synthesis of Great Atlantic and Graham is prefigured by regional circuit
cases from the 1970s and 1980s, which are replete with much the same synthesis as that found in
KSR. See, e.g., Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., 672 F.2d 523, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1982); M-C
Indus. v. Precision Dynamics Corp., 634 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1980); Dual Mfg. v. Burris
Indus., 619 F.2d 660, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Reinke Mfg. v. Sidney Mfg,, 594 F.2d
644, 646, 648-52 (8th Cir. 1979); Astro Music, Inc. v. Eastham, 564 F.2d 1236, 1237-38 (9th Cir.
1977); Robbins Co. v. Dresser Indus., 554 F.2d 1289, 1290-91, 1295 (5th Cir. 1977); Deere &
Co. v. Sperry Rand Co., 513 F.2d 1131, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1975); Regimbal v. Scymansky, 444
F.2d 333, 338-40 (9th Cir. 1971).
See Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nies, J.)
("Milliken is correct that this court has discarded the proposition[] that it is difficult to find 'true
invent[ion],' i.e., non-obviousness, in a combination patent ...."); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,
724 F.2d 951, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("It is ... simplistically unrealistic to employ a
separate test of patentability for combinations of old elements when the language of the 1952
Patent Act provides no basis for either classifying patents into different 'types' or for applying
different treatment to different 'types' of patents."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.,
721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("There is neither a statutory distinction
between 'combination patents' and some other, never defined type of patent, nor a reason to treat
the conditions for patentability differently with respect to 'combination patents.' It but obfuscates
the law to posit a non-statutory, judge-created classification labeled 'combination patents."');
Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Rich, J.) ("It was error for
the district court to derogate the likelihood of finding patentable invention in a combination of old
elements. No species of invention is more suspect as a matter of law than any other."); Envtl.
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("That
all elements of an invention may have been old (the normal situation), or some old and some new,
or all new, is however, simply irrelevant. Virtually all inventions are combinations and virtually
all are combinations of old elements."); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.) ("There is no warrant for judicial classification of patents, whether
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Circuit could state, with no apparent hint of irony, that it "has dispelled th[e]
notion" that "'combination inventions' are to be treated differently from other
inventions." 44 This "notion" was not, of course, the Federal Circuit's to dispel. As
Professor Lunney put it in 2001, "the Federal Circuit has refused to follow the
Supreme Court's lead on this issue., 45 That refusal plainly could not continue.
The presumptive obviousness of combination claims, reaffirmed in KSR, is
compelling not merely on stare decisis grounds, but also because the approach
highlights the basic incompatibility between the Federal Circuit's dullard phosita
and the expansive inquiry about any "apparent reason to combine the known
into 'combination' patents and some other unnamed and undefined class or otherwise. Nor is
there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of patents based on a judicially devised
label. Reference to 'combination' patents is, moreover, meaningless."); In re Menough, 323 F.2d
1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (Rich, J.) ("Mechanical elements can do no more than contribute to
the combination the mechanical functions of which they are inherently capable. The patentability
of combinations has always depended on the unobviousness of the combination per se."). One
commentator, at least, proved prescient, opining that "the legal authority for the [Federal
Circuit's] combination standards ... may well turn out to be a house of cards under the scrutiny of
the Supreme Court." Robert W. Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal
Circuit Standards for Obviousness of Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 66, 67 (1986).
Chief Judge Markey, in a 1983 talk at the University of Chicago Law School, attacked the notions
that "a combination of old elements is not patentable" and that "[a]n invention in which each
element performs only its expected function is not patentable," classing the Supreme Court's
decision in Great Atlantic as misguided. Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'W 331, 333-35 & 334 n.8 (1983). According to Chief Judge Markey,
"[t]he question is not, or never should be, whether all of the elements in the combination are old.
Only God works from nothing. Man must work with old elements." Id. at 334. What this view
overlooks, however, is that, by using a presumption framework that turns on whether a claim is a
combination claim, we can structure the process of inquiring about nonobviousness to get more
accurate outcomes more efficiently. KSR deploys Great Atlantic for just this enhanced accuracy
and efficiency, thereby rejecting Chief Judge Markey's antipresumption binarism, according to
which "[i]deally, all patent rights to all inventions . . . would receive the same 'scrutiny' under the
statute" and "[t]he claimed invention either meets the patentability requirements of the statute or it
doesn't." Id. at 334 n.7.
44 Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But cf Republic Indus. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 1979) (It is a "truism that when all the parts of a
claimed invention are known, the combination (and the act of combining) is likely to be more
obvious to one reasonably skilled in the art."); id. at 972 n.25 ("The Supreme Court has expressed
this idea in similar terms: 'Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care
proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding (a patentable) invention in an assembly
of old elements ....' (citing Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 152 (1950), accord Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976))); Reeves Instrument
Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 271 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The [Supreme] Court's
decision in A&P recognizes that non-obviousness is less likely to occur in combination patents,
and therefore applies a somewhat more stringent rule of non-obviousness to such patents. It is not
inconsistent with, but merely in application of, the general rule stated in [§] 103.").
45 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363, 379 (2001).
Prof. Lunney's observation is not a new one. Thirty years ago, Sears described the same
intransigence as it had been shown up to 1977. See Sears, supra note 39, at 95-105.
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elements' 46 that KSR mandates. An ordinary artisan who is endowed with enough
creativity to prevent the nonobviousness standard from collapsing into a multi-
reference novelty standard47 will routinely solve problems by adaptively remixing
prior art elements. The Court thus instructs us that, when exploring the reason to
combine known elements, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ. 48
Describing the Federal Circuit's errors in analyzing the validity of the claim
in suit, the Court also states that "in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be
able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle., 49 The
Court even rejects as error the Federal Circuit's routine denial of an "obvious to
try" account of why a given invention would have been obvious, relying instead on
the ordinary artisan's ordinary creativity in trying out familiar options.5° In short,
"[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
46 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
47 As I have explained elsewhere,
denying the ordinary artisan's creative capacity threatens to collapse the nonobviousness
requirement into a mere supemovelty requirement. If ordinary artisans truly cannot invent, then
every new invention necessarily constitutes an advance beyond the reach of the ordinary inventor;
nonobviousness is assured, by definition. All that remains is to verify that no express pointer in
the art directs the ordinary artisan to an insight he is powerless to make on his own. In such a
regime, an invention is new if it is not already taught by a single piece of prior art, and it is
supernew (and thus patentable), even if its elements are scattered among the art, so long as there
is no suggestion to combine or modify that prior art to make the new invention.
Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 12 (Peter Yu
ed., 2006); see also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 15, at 161 ("Worse, the current Federal
Circuit approach risks diluting the nonobviousness requirement to little more than an anticipation
test conducted over multiple references."); John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 496
(2003) ("Asking whether there was a suggestion in the prior art to combine two references seems
much closer to a novelty test than to a non-obviousness test-and using this standard as a bright
line for non-obviousness effectively eliminates the non-obviousness requirement."); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 170-72 (2006) (arguing that a rigid
suggestion test converts the obviousness inquiry into an anticipation inquiry).
48 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. In other words, we can count on a person of ordinary skill to take
"creative steps" and make inferences about how to remix prior art elements effectively.
Id. at 1742.
50 Id. ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is
likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the
fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.").
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automaton." 51  The Supreme Court has thus banished the dullard phosita of
Standard Oil,52 just as the Federal Trade Commission recommended in its 2003
report 53 and as two amici, including the United States, urged in KSR.
5 4
IV. The Combination Claim Antiphony
What is the way forward, then? Although I have used the phrase
"presumptively obvious" here, it is not a phrase that appears in KSR. Indeed, the
only presumption the Court mentions in KSR is the presumption of validity that
extends to all issued patents.55 Thus one could argue, with some reason, that it goes
too far, after KSR, to formally establish a rebuttable presumption framework for
adjudicating the obviousness vel non of combination claims. That is, the Court
could have created a presumption if it wanted to, but it didn't-perhaps we
shouldn't either. This argument seems even stronger when one considers that the
Supreme Court has not been shy about creating new presumptions in recent cases,
56
51 Id. Thirty years ago, Sears drew the same conclusion from her review of the Supreme Court's
leading cases, including Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea. See Sears, supra note 39, at 99 ("the level
of ordinary skill at any given time affords the basis for associating old elements in any manner
which merely takes advantage of their known capabilities.").
52 Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
53 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 15 ("The Commission urges that in assessing
obviousness, the analysis should ascribe to the person having ordinary skill in the art an ability to
combine or modify prior art references that is consistent with the creativity and problem-solving
skills that in fact are characteristic of those having ordinary skill in the art.").
54 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2453601 ("The Federal Circuit's
systemic diminishment of the role of the person of ordinary skill and its miserly assessment of that
person's capabilities has distorted the Graham framework. The Court should reiterate that the role
of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill is critical in the nonobviousness inquiry and that the
person is understood to have 'an ability to combine and modify prior art references that is
consistent with the creativity and problem-solving skills that in fact are characteristic of those
having ordinary skill in the art."' (quoting FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 15));
Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 26, KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2452369 ("The factual
determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art should not be limited to the content of prior
art references, the common knowledge of those in the art, and any suggestions to combine the art
that are found in those references or knowledge. It should also encompass the PHOSITA's
ordinary inventive skills, the tools and methods routinely applied in her field, and the kinds of
experimentation she does and problems she solves as a matter of course.").
55 See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745 (discussing the presumption). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282
(establishing the presumption).
56 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001) ("A utility patent is
strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional. If trade dress protection is sought
for those features the strong evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by
the party seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed the features in
question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of
showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental,
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at least where the "doctrine of equivalents" theory of patent infringement is
concerned.
57
The Court's clear recommitment to Great Atlantic, however, requires that the
lower courts, and the Patent Office, find a reliable way to treat combination claims
with the proper caution against erroneously granting patent protection to what is, in
truth, an ordinary innovation. A rebuttable presumption of obviousness, applicable
against combination claims, seems the best way to prompt the patentee to provide
an adequate evidentiary basis for rejecting what is more likely true, given that
"[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. ' 8  Indeed, such
prompting is among a presumption's classic functions5 9 Given that petitioner KSR
urged the Court to put less of a premium on fully stating a formal legal framework
than on rejecting the patentability of the adjustable pedal patent on the merits,6°
perhaps we have a little more liberty to translate KSR's instructions into a
presumption model.
A nonobviousness analysis requires, in effect, a call and response. I first
proposed a version of this rebuttable presumption model in May 2006,61 without the
benefit of KSR; after KSR, it seems more appropriate than ever. Cast in terms of
Patent Office process, the call and response would proceed as follows:
At the Patent Office, the examiner should canvass the pertinent prior art to
determine which elements, if any, in a given claim can be found in the prior art, and
assess whether the claimed invention uses those prior art elements for their known
functions or roles. The pertinent prior art will contain either all the elements in the
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device."); In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1060
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (TrafFix concerned "whether a claimed feature of an expired patent could acquire
trade dress protection, and the Court held that there was a rebuttable presumption that it could
not.").
57 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (establishing a
rebuttable presumption that a claim amendment was for reasons of patentability); Festo v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that a narrowing claim amendment estops reliance on the doctrine of equivalents).
58 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
59 See Ronald J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated: Burdens of Proof Uncertainty, and
Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 636 (1994) (explaining
that, among other things, presumptions "creat[e] incentives to the production of information").
60 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-
1530), 2006 WL 3367870 ("As important as are legal tests for determining ultimate questions of
patent validity, the holdings of this Court applying substantive patent legal standards are of even
greater importance to litigants and other participants in the U.S. patent system."). Thanks to John
Duffy for drawing my attention to this passage.
61 Joseph Scott Miller, Toward a New Nonobviousness Analysis, The Fire of Genius,
http://www.thefireofgenius.com/2006/05/30/toward-a-new-nonobviousness-analysis/ (May 30,
2006).
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claim under review serving the same functions, all the elements in the claim under
review but playing different functions, or less than all the elements in the claim
under review.
If the pertinent prior art contains all the elements in the claim serving their
prior art functions, the examiner should make an initial rejection of the claim that
explains this state of affairs. At that point, the burden of production would shift to
the applicant to overcome the presumptive obviousness of the claim.62  The
applicant could do so with objective evidence of nonobviousness, e.g., proof that
the prior art expressly taught away from making the combination in the claim under
review, that other identifiable parties had tried and failed to solve the problem the
applicant has successfully solved, or that the claimed combination yields
unexpectedly effective or powerful results. 63 Absent any such evidence, the claim
would be unpatentable for obviousness.
If the pertinent prior art contains all the elements in the claim but at least one
element is playing a new function, or the art does not contain all the elements in the
claim, the burden would be on the examiner to prove that the invention would have
been obvious. Specifically, the examiner should not make an initial rejection in this
circumstance unless she could state "a reason that would have prompted a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed
new invention does." 64 The ordinary artisan's ordinary creativity will no doubt
play a significant role in this analysis.
65
62 Cf KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740 ("[A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.").
63 This group of rebuttal evidence sources is broader than I had preferred in May 2006. Cf Miller,
supra note 61.
64 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. On October 10, 2007, the PTO issued new guidelines "for determining
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103 in view of the Supreme Court decision in KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc." Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103
in View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526,
57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007). According to these new guidelines, "[t]he key to supporting any rejection
under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would
have been obvious." Id. at 57,528. The guidelines thus provide, as illustrations, seven rationales
that could explain why a given invention would have been obvious (upon a proper factual
showing). Id. at 57,529.
65 Post-KSR decisions at the Federal Circuit suggest that an ordinary artisan's ordinary creativity can
provide an adequate account for why an invention would have been obvious. For example, in
Leapfrog Enterprises, the Federal Circuit affirmed a trial court's verdict that the claimed
invention-an interactive electronic children's toy-would have been obvious over the prior art
Bevan patent and a Texas Instruments toy, the Super Speak & Read (SSR). Leapfrog Enters. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court affirmed the verdict even though the
two cited prior art references lacked one of the features of the claimed invention-namely, a
"reader." Id. at 1162. According to the court, this creative addition would have been well within
the ordinary artisan's grasp:
[T]he reasons for adding a reader to the Bevan/SSR combination are the same as those for using
readers in other children's toys-namely, providing an added benefit and simplified use of the toy
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A court challenge would unfold in the same way, with the accused infringer
playing a role analogous to that of the Patent Office. Of course, under current law,
the presumption of validity would require that the accused infringer present clear
and convincing evidence of the pertinent prior art. However, in this presumption
framework, upon a showing that the prior art contains all the elements of the claim
serving their prior art functions, the patentee would bear the burden of coming
forward with evidence adequate to overcome the presumptive obviousness of the
claimed invention. Absent the introduction of such evidence, the claim would fall.
I am not the only one to have proposed a rebuttable presumption framework
for analyzing obviousness. Indeed, I am not the only one to do so in the context of
KSR. First, in August 2006, IBM filed an amicus brief in KSR that urged the Court
to "retain the long-standing teaching-suggestion-motivation test, but establish a
clear rule permitting the application of a rebuttable presumption that prior art
references would be combined by one of ordinary skill in the art., 6 6 Given that the
Supreme Court has now rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid suggestion test, it is no
longer vital to reconcile that test with a rebuttable presumption framework (as IBM
strove to do). Second, in March 2007, Professor Timothy Holbrook proposed an
elegant, two-way presumption framework designed to leverage the mirrored
relationship between evidence of a suggestion to combine prior art elements (which
points toward a conclusion of obviousness) and evidence that the prior art teaches
away from the combination (which points toward a conclusion of
nonobviousness). 67 According to Professor Holbrook,
[i]f all of the limitations of the claim are present in the prior art, then the court would
look for either a motivation to combine the prior art or a teaching away from the
claimed invention. The presence of a suggestion to combine should create a
for the child in order to increase its marketability. Leapfrog presents no evidence that the
inclusion of a reader in this type of device was uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art. Nor does Leapfrog present any evidence that the inclusion of a device
commonly used in the field of electronics (a reader), and even in the narrower art of electronic
children's toys, represented an unobvious step over the prior art.
Id (citation omitted).
Similarly, in In re Comiskey, the Federal Circuit, in the context of a remand to the PTO, offered
that it was unlikely that the remaining claims in the case would clear the nonobviousness hurdle.
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007). According to the court, "[t]he routine
addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima
facie case of obviousness." Id. at 1380. Just as in Leapfrog, the Comiskey court effectively relies
on the ordinary creativity of an ordinary artisan to engage in situation-appropriate electronification
of prior art items.
66 Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in Support of Neither Party at 18,
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2430566.
67 Timothy R. Holbrook, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to Combine: A
Presumption-Based Approach, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS, March 21, 2007,
http://washulrev.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html.
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presumption of obviousness, rebuttable by strong secondary considerations, such as the
failure of others, unexpected results, or long-felt but unsolved need, or by contrary
evidence from the prior art. Similarly, the presence of a teaching away should create a
presumption of non-obviousness, rebuttable by other secondary considerations
suggesting the advancement was merely trivial or by other parts of the prior art
demonstrating that one of skill in the art would not view this combination as being
discouraged by the prior art. Importantly, in the absence of either a suggestion to
combine or a teaching away, no presumption arises and the court should apply the
Graham methodology alone, absent any presumptions. Indeed, the absence of either a
motivation or a teaching away says very little about the state of the art one way or the
other- it is merely an absence of evidence and not evidence of a lack of technical know-
how.18
Importantly, Professor Holbrook makes no mention of Great Atlantic's
insistence that "[c]ourts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care
proportioned to the difficulty and improbability offinding invention in an assembly
of old elements.,
69
I think my presumption framework is more sound than IBM's or Professor
Holbrook's, for two reasons. First, unlike the other proposed frameworks, mine
fully credits the Supreme Court's commitment to caution where combination
claims are concerned. Neither IBM nor Professor Holbrook expressly tailors the
presumption to combination claims.7° I do, and KSR vindicates this approach.
Second, my framework performs in the same way, and on the same theory, as
a presumption of obviousness with which the Federal Circuit (and the CCPA, its
predecessor) already has about 65 years of experience. Specifically, "[w]here a
claimed range overlaps with a range disclosed in the prior art, there is a
presumption of obviousness. The presumption can be rebutted if it can be shown
that the prior art teaches away from the claimed range, or the claimed range
produces new and unexpected results." 71 This line of authority originates no later
68 Id.
69 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) (emphasis
added).
70 Professor Holbrook's proposed framework does focus on combination claims, in the sense that a
presumption is triggered, if at all, only "[i]f all of the limitations of the claim are present in the
prior art," i.e., if the claim is a combination claim. Holbrook, supra note 67.
71 Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see
also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Geisler concedes that the examiner was
correct to find the claims prima facie obvious, because the claimed thickness range of 50 to 100
Angstroms for the protective layer overlaps at its end point with the thickness range of 100 to 600
Angstroms disclosed by Zehender. Addressing a case similar in some respects to this one, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that a prima facie case of obviousness can be rebutted
if the applicant (1) can establish 'the existence of unexpected properties in the range claimed' or
(2) can show 'that the art in any material respect taught away' from the claimed invention."
(quoting In re Malagari, 499 F.2d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1974)) (citations omitted)); In re
Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The law is replete with cases in which the
difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within
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than 1943,72 and embraces structural/mechanical technology as much as chemical
technology. 73 The theory of this established presumption of obviousness is that
ordinary skill in the art includes, by definition, the motivation to optimize known
variables: "The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is
already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed
set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages. 74 Similarly,
KSR (and its rekindling of Great Atlantic) teaches that ordinary skill in the art
includes, by definition, creative remixing of prior art elements consistent with their
known functions: "Common sense teaches.. . that familiar items may have obvious
uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill
will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle., 75 By parity of reasoning, a presumption of obviousness is proper for
combination claims in the same way it is for claims that recite a range that overlaps
with a prior art range. It is interesting, too, that the Patent Office's Board of Patent
Appeals & Interferences, in two post-KSR precedential decisions, has applied
something close to a rebuttable presumption framework for combination claims.
76
the claims. These cases have consistently held that in such a situation, the applicant must show
that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves
unexpected results relative to the prior art range. Woodruff has made no such showing in the
present case." (citations omitted)); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955) ("[E]ven
though applicant's modification results in great improvement and utility over the prior art, it may
still not be patentable if the modification was within the capabilities of one skilled in the art. More
particularly, where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not
inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation." (citations
omitted)). Neither IBM's amicus brief nor Professor Holbrook's proposal makes reference to this
line of cases.
72 See In re Cooper, 134 F.2d 630, 632 (C.C.P.A. 1943) ("[I]f the prior art shows a range, as
appellants apparently admit it does in this case, which includes the range claimed in their
application, in the absence of the production of a different product they are not entitled to a
patent.").
73 See Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 ("[T]he issue of the '015
patent's obviousness arises because the prior art showed one, two and four elongated handles on
weight plates .... The key feature of the '015 patent, the fact that there are three elongated
handles, falls within a range disclosed by the prior art."); id. at 1322 ("[W]here there is a range
disclosed in the prior art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, there is a presumption
of obviousness. But the presumption will be rebutted if it can be shown: (1) [t]hat the prior art
taught away from the claimed invention, or (2) that there are new and unexpected results relative
to the prior art." (citations omitted)).
74 In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276
(C.C.P.A. 1980) ("[D]iscovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable in a known
process is ordinarily within the skill of the art."); Aller, 220 F.2d at 458 ("No invention is involved
in discovering optimum ranges of a process by routine experimentation.").
75 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).
76 See Exparte Smith, No. 2007-1925, 2007 WL 1813761, at *11 (B.P.A.I. June 25, 2007) (Smith's
"claims ... were combinations which only unite old elements with no change in their respective
functions and which yield predictable results. Thus, the claimed subject matter likely would have
been obvious under KSR. In addition, neither [Smith's] Specification nor [Smith's] arguments
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V. Conclusion
What remains of the Federal Circuit's suggestion test? Not quite nothing.
"[I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed
new invention does. 7 7 KSR emphasizes, however, that one such reason is that
ordinary artisans know the value of remixing the familiar elements of their arts to
solve new problems. In KSR itself, for example, there "existed a marketplace that
created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the
prior art taught a number of methods for achieving this advance. 78 If the patent
claim in question is a remix of the prior art, the reason prompting the combination
is likely the phosita's basic creative ability. All that remains is to allow rebuttal
that the claim is not what it seems, i.e., an obvious adaptation of prior art elements.
Hindsight dread has been demoted, and the phosita reinvigorated. The
suggestion test, if it still makes sense to call it that, persists in a different milieu
tuned to a different priority-namely, avoiding wrongful patent grants by means of,
among other things, a healthy skepticism about the likelihood that a combination
claim is nonobvious. And the nonobviousness inquiry has a new operational core,
in the form of a phosita who is also a person of ordinary creativity. What remains
of the Federal Circuit's suggestion test? Perhaps as much, or as little, as remains of
Bach's Minuet in G Major (BWV Anh 114) in jazz artist John Stebbe's Bach Jazz
(Minuet in G).79
present any evidence that the modifications necessary to effect the combination are uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art. Because this is a case where the
improvement is no more than 'the simple substitution of one known element for another or the
mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement,' KSR, 127
S.Ct. at 1740, no further analysis was required by the Examiner. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1740."); Ex
parte Catan, Appeal 2007-0820, 2007 WL 1934867, at *10 (B.P.A.I. July 3, 2007) ("The claim is
to a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one known
element for another element known in the field for the same function .... [Catan] has presented
no evidence that combining the Nakano device with the Harada bioauthentication means would
have required anything more from one of ordinary skill in the art than to substitute one
authentication means for a more advanced one. Accordingly, we hold that the subject matter of
claim 5 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art given the teachings of Nakano
and Harada.")
77 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
78 Id. at 1744.
79 You can hear the first at YouTube.com, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Kxe5zCl-cWM, and
the second at macjams.com, http://www.macjams.com/song/10100.
